# SAFETY IN GAS DISTRIBUTION ACTIVITIES: TECHNICAL STANDARDS, PERFORMANCE STANDARDS, AND ECONOMIC REGULATION

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#### WHAT IS SAFETY?

### SAFETY IN GAS TRANSPORTATION AND DISTRIBUTION ACTIVITIES

THE CAPABILITY TO PREVENT ACCIDENTS AND TO MANAGE EMERGENCIES

SAFETY IS THE PRIMARY QUALITY FACTOR IN GAS DISTRIBUTION SERVICE



- NETWORK SAFETY RULES
- GAS LEAKS
- GAS ODOURIZATION
- CATHODE PROTECTION
- EMERGENCY INTERVENTION
- SUPPLY INTERRUPTIONS (WITH AND WITHOUT NOTICE)



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SUPPLY

DISTRIBUTION

#### SAFETY IN GAS DISTRIBUTION

- SAFETY CANNOT BE INDIVIDUALLY NEGOTIATED
- UTILITY REGULATION SHOULD EXPLICITLY INCLUDE SAFETY RULES
- ◆ THESE ARE EVEN MORE NECESSARY IF:
  - > THE BUSINESS HAS BEEN PRIVATIZED
  - > THE GAS BUSINESS HAS BEEN UNBUNDLED
  - > PRICE-CAP REGULATION HAS BEEN INTRODUCED
  - COMPETITION FOR THE MARKET (COMPETITIVE CONTRACTING) HAS BEEN LAUNCHED
- GAS SUPPLY COMPETITION HAS NO DIRECT EFFECTS ON SAFETY LEVELS




## REGULATORS APPROACH TO GAS SAFETY

- ◆ FROM COMPANIES' DECISIONS (NATIONAL CHAMPIONS; SELF-REGULATION) TO REGULATION
- MIX OF ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL REGULATION
- ◆ SELF-REGULATION IS WELCOME, PROVIDED THAT ADEQUATE CONTROLS AND SANCTIONS FOR VIOLATION ARE INTRODUCED
- ◆ PUBLIC SAFETY RULES FOR (AT LEAST PARTIALLY) PRIVATE MANAGEMENT APPEARS TO BE THE NEW PREVAILING REGULATORY APPROACH



#### SAFETY REGULATION PHASES





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### GAS DISTRIBUTION IN ITALY Main features

- ◆ ABOUT 400 LOCAL DISTRIBUTORS
- MUNICIPAL DISTRIBUTION LICENCES (ABOUT 6000)
- MORE THAN 3000 DISTRIBUTION PLANTS
- ◆ SINCE JANUARY 2003 DISTRIBUTION AND SUPPLY ARE LEGALLY UNBUNDLED (DIFFERENT COMPANIES)



#### SAFETY REGULATION IN ITALY

#### Stage 1 (until 2000)

◆ SAFETY REGULATION IS BASED ON TECHNICAL STANDARDS AND RULES



#### SAFETY REGULATION IN ITALY


#### Stage 2 (2001-2003)

- SAFETY REGULATION IS BASED ON STANDARDS OF PERFORMANCE
  - MEASUREMENT RULES FOR LEADING SAFETY AND CONTINUITY FACTORS (SINCE 2001)
  - FOR EACH DISTRIBUTION PLANT, SAFETY AND CONTINUITY INDEXES FOR EACH DISTRIBUTION PLANT (SINCE 2002)
  - ➤ OVERALL STANDARDS (SINCE 2002)



#### SAFETY-RELATED PERFORMANCE Before regulation

YEARLY PERCENTAGE OF LOW PRESSURE PIPES INSPECTED - 1999





#### SAFETY REGULATION 2001-2003 Overall standards

SAFETY INDICATOR	OVERALL STANDARDS	OPTIMUM QUALITY LEVELS
PERCENTAGE OF HIGH AND MEDIUM PRESSURE PIPES INSPECTED	30%	90%
PERCENTAGE OF LOW PRESSURE PIPES INSPECTED	20%	70%
NUMBER OF LOCALIZED LEAKAGES PER KM OF PIPES	0,8	0,1
CONVENTIONAL NUMBER OF GAS ODORIZATION LEVEL MEASUREMENTS PER THOUSAND OF CUSTOMERS	OD <sub>min</sub> (see paragraph 9.4 of Reg. Order 236/00)	0,5




**Compulsory minimum overall standards** 



#### SAFETY REGULATION EFFECTS (1)

PERCENTAGE OF PIPES INSPECTED 1997-2004 (Mandatory Targets: LP 20%/year; HP/MP 30%/year)





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
#### SAFETY REGULATION EFFECTS (2)

- ♦ 7 NEW NATIONAL GUIDELINES ISSUED BY TECHNICAL ASSOCIATIONS IN 2001-2003 UNDER AEEG'S SUPERVISION
  - >CATHODE PROTECTION
  - **>ODOURIZATION**
  - > PLANNED PIPE INSPECTION
  - LEAKAGE CLASSIFICATION
  - > PROMPT INTERVENTION
  - **EMERGENCIES**
  - **ACCIDENTS**



#### SAFETY REGULATION EFFECTS (3)

#### PROMPT INTERVENTION





## SAFETY REGULATION IN ITALY Stage 3 (2004-2008)

- ◆ SAFETY REGULATION IS BASED ON BOTH STANDARDS AND ECONOMIC INCENTIVES
- ◆ 2004-2005: SOME ECONOMIC INCENTIVES HAVE BEEN INTRODUCED:
  - SANCTIONS FOR VIOLATION OF AEEG DIRECTIVES
  - ► (NEW) ECONOMIC PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION OF THE OVERALL STANDARD FOR PROMPT INTERVENTION



## ECONOMIC PENALTY ON PROMPT INTERVENTION STANDARD VIOLATION

SAFETY INDICATOR	BASIS THRESHOLD	REFERENCE THRESHOLD
PERCENTAGE OF PROMPT INTERVENTION CALLS WITH ARRIVAL ON SITE WITHIN 60 MINUTES	90%	95%
TIME FOR SAFETY RESTORATION IN CASE OF MAIN LEAKAGES	M	M



**Compulsory minimum threshold** 



500 Euro penalty for each intervention later than 60 minutes



**Monitoring** 



basis threshold = acceptable quality level reference threshold = optimum quality level

#### **ECONOMIC PENALTIES WORK**

#### ... but

## SANCTIONS AND PENALTIES PUSH DISTRIBUTORS TO COMPLY WITH MINIMUM THRESHOLDS, NOT TOWARD CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT

→ INCENTIVES MAY BE USED TO THIS PURPOSE



## RELEVANT ACTIVITIES FOR SAFETY INCENTIVES

- RELEVANT ACTIVITIES FOR SAFETY INCENTIVES UNDER CONSIDERATION FOR ECONOMIC INCENTIVES:
  - 1. GAS ODOURIZATION MEASUREMENT
  - 2. PROMPT INTERVENTION
  - 3. LEAKAGES LOCALIZATION AND ELIMINATION
  - 4. CATHODIC PROTECTION OF STEEL PIPES
- > 1-2% OF ADDITIONAL REVENUES ALLOWED TO DISTRIBUTION COMPANIES



## 1. GAS ODOURIZATION MEASUREMENT INCREASE

#### PROS

- ESSENTIAL FOR SAFETY IN THE USE OF GAS
- LEAKAGES LOCALIZATION AND ELIMINATION INCREASE
- > FULLY UNDER UTILITY'S CONTROL

#### CONS

MARGINAL POSITIVE EFFECTS ARE LOW

⇒ +++ FOR SAFETY INCENTIVES



## 2. PROMPT INTERVENTION TIME REDUCTION

#### PROS

► TIME REDUCTION FOR PROMPT INTERVENTION MEANS RISK REDUCTION

#### CONS

- > THE AVERAGE DELAY FOR PROMPT INTERVENTION IS ALREADY LOW (36 MINUTES IN 2003)
- ➤ IT IS NOT COMPLETELY UNDER THE DISTRIBUTOR'S CONTROL (TRAFFIC, WEATHER CONDITIONS, NUMBER OF CALLS, ETC.)

> POTENTIALLY MISLEADING FOR ECONOMIC INCENTIVES



## 3. LEAKAGES LOCALIZATION AND ELIMINATION IMPROVEMENT

#### PROS

- LEAKAGES ARE THE MAIN RISK FACTOR IN GAS DISTRIBUTION AND USE
- > LEAKAGES REDUCTION HELPS:
  - ✓ THE RESPECT OF KYOTO PROTOCOL
  - ENERGY SAVING
  - ✓ THE REDUCTION OF DISTRIBUTION'S COSTS

#### CONS

- BEHAVIUORS ARE AFFECTED BY WEATHER AND "LARGE EVENTS" EFFECT
- ⇒ +++ FOR SAFETY INCENTIVES



## 4. CATHODIC PROTECTION OF STEEL PIPES IMPROVEMENT

#### PROS

> IT IS ESSENTIAL FOR THE REDUCTION OF LEAKAGES FROM STEEL PIPES

#### CONS

COMPLEXITY OF TECHNICAL ASPECTS PREVENT THE USE OF SIMPLE ECONOMIC INCENTIVES

PROBLEMS FOR SAFETY INCENTIVES



#### ITALIAN INCENTIVE REGIME FOR IMPROVING GAS SAFETY (1)

- ♦ AEEG DIRECTIVE 243/2005
- TARGETS
  - MORE ODOURIZATION LEVEL MEASUREMENTS
  - LEAKS REDUCTION (CONVERGENCE)
- SEPARATE ECONOMIC INCENTIVES FOR:
  - ADDITIONAL YEARLY GAS ODOURIZATION LEVEL MEASUREMENTS
  - LEAKS REDUCTION (ANNUAL NUMBER OF LEAKS POINTED OUT BY CUSTOMERS)
- ◆ LEAKAGE COMPONENT: A LONG-TERM PROCESS (11 YEARS)
  - > 2006-2008: VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION, ONLY BONUSES
  - > 2009-2016: COMPULSORY REGIME, BONUSES AND PENALTIES



#### ITALIAN INCENTIVE REGIME FOR IMPROVING GAS SAFETY (2)

- ◆ CALCULATION OF VARIABLE ALPHA, FOR EACH DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM J ELIGIBLE FOR LEAKAGE BONUSES
- ◆ ALPHA<sub>J</sub> EXPRESSES THE ANNUAL RATE OF IMPROVEMENT REQUIRED TO BRING THE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM J, OVER THE COURSE OF THREE REGULATORY PERIODS (11 YEARS), FROM THE BASELINE LIVPART<sub>J</sub> TO THE TARGET LEVEL LIVOB<sup>K</sup>
- ◆ ALPHA, IS CALCULATED AS FOLLOWS:


WHERE ALPHA<sub>J</sub>  $\leq 20\%$ 

$$\alpha_{j} = \max \left[ 1 - \left( \frac{LivOb^{k}}{LivPart_{j}} \right)^{\frac{1}{11}}; 2\% \right]$$



#### ITALIAN INCENTIVE REGIME FOR IMPROVING GAS SAFETY (3)

- CONVERGENCE TOWARD NATIONAL TARGETS
- DIFFERENT TARGETS FOR HIGH, MEDIUM AND LOW CONCENTRATION AREAS





#### **CONCLUSIONS**

- ◆ AN OPTIMAL SAFETY POLICY IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF PRIVATE DECISION MAKING
- PRICE-CAP REGIMES AND PRIVATIZATION REQUIRE AN INCREASING ROLE OF THE AUTHORITIES
- ◆ REGULATION SHOULD BE ABLE TO GUARANTEE A WELFARE INCREASE BY ACHIEVING THE REQUIRED LEVEL OF SAFETY
- MARKET OPENING IS FULLY COMPATIBLE WITH SAFETY
- ◆ ECONOMIC INCENTIVES MAY BE ADDED TO TECHNICAL STANDARDS AND PERFORMANCE STANDARDS TO PROMOTE CONTINUOUS SAFETY IMPROVEMENT

