### Regulation and Investment, in the Energy Domain: some remarks

George H. B. Verberg President International Gas Union at the 5th ERRA Conference, Budapest.



#### INTERNATIONAL GAS UNION www.igu.org

International non-profit organization founded in 1931

- Objective:To promote the technical & economic progressof the gas industry
- Members:Associations of the gas industries in 67 countries23 associate member companies




www.wgc2006.nl 23<sup>rd</sup> World Gas Conference 6-9 June 2006, Amsterdam

## **Themes for Today**


- The World needs Energy, at what Prices and what about Investments?
- LNG changes the Global Gas Scene;
- Government Actions, Regulation, Liberalization.

### Energy Consumption in Perspective




IEA data year 2002

### Total Energy Demand by Region 2002 and 2030



### EU Energy Demand Forecast IEA EU (25)

#### **Growth relative to consumption in 2002**



### Oil Prices: How High is High?

Oil prices in US\$ of 2004:

- 1864: 92 \$/b, but at that time no oil dependent economy
- 1980: 81 \$/b, economic difficulties
- 2004: 55 \$/b
- 2005: 60+ \$/b
- 2006: 70+ \$/b
- Expected: restraints in refinery capacity lifted by 2008

#### **Replacement of Reserves**

... the industry has replaced only half the reserves it has produced and needs to spend \$ 40 bn a year, rather than the current \$ 14 bn, to ensure it found a new barrel of oil for every barrel consumed.

(Wood Mackenzie in Financial Times, 4 Oct 2005)

What are reasons for this shortfall ??


# Corruption and bribery versus oil and gas reserves

- Corruption index (by *Transparency International*) ranks countries' degree of corruption among public officials and politicians.
  - 0 = highly corrupt 10 = clean

TI data 2005; reserves data BP june 2005


5th ERRA conference, May 15-16 2006

#### % of proven oil/gas reserves





# SoS: Who Owns the Gas (and Oil) Reserves?



5th ERRA conference, May 15-16 2006

#### Walking for Nationalization of Bolivian Natural Gas



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National oil company reserves (access with investment)

Russian companies' reserves

6% 77<u>%</u>

11%

6%

National oil company reserves (no access)

	COMPANY	HOME COUNTRY	COMBINED OIL AND NATURAL GAS RESERVES* (BILLIONS OF BARRELS)
1	Gazprom	Russia	254.0
2	Saudi Aramco	Saudi Arabia	250.0
3	PDVSA	Venezuela	247.9
4	Qatar Petroleum	Qatar	199.4
5	Iraqi Oil Ministry	Iraq	136.9
6	Exxon Mobil	United States	71.3
7	KPC	Kuwait	61.3
8	BP	Britain	56.5
9	ADNOC	U.A.E.	55.8
10	<b>Royal Dutch Shell</b>	Britain/Netherlands	52.7
11	NIOC	Iran	49.3
12	Total	France	39.5
13	Chevron	United States	38.8 -
14	Rosneft	Russia	38.1
15	Pemex	Mexico	32.5
16	NNPC	Nigeria	31.3 📕
17	Lukoil	Russia	27.7 🔲
18	Sonatrach	Algeria	26.8 📖


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


Major Natural Gas Trade Movements at the Start of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: No Single Global Gas Market but Regional Gas Markets


Trade flows worldwide (billion cubic metres)



#### Middle East LNG—Setting a New Global Cost Benchmark (\$ per MMBtu)




Connecting Markets, Competing Markets!



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### more aligned: LNG can find its way everywhere.

#### **Benchmark World Gas Prices**



Source: M. Speltz, Chevron, sept 2005

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#### Russia's Diversification of Gas Export; Away From Europe



## **Themes for Today**

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### Government action (example) ARGENTINA - CHILE

- LT-supply contract for gas from Argentina to (on purpose build) gas-fired power station in Chile;
- Gas price in Argentina more or less in line with oil price: structural balance in gas demand-supply;
- 'Pesofication': gas prices (peso-related) were decoupled from oil prices (\$-related) and fell therefore relative to oil prices;
- Government gave no permission to increase gas prices (to make good for devaluation of peso)

### Government action(example) ARGENTINA - CHILE (2)


- Result: fall of gas exploration and -production (prices to low) BUT sharp increase of gas demand (TAXI's turning to CNG etc.):
- Shortage of gas in Argentina:
- Argentinean government "closed" the valve for export to CHILE
- LESSON: If gas is fundamentally priced out of step with its relevant competitors you're in for problems:
- The Argentinean gas industry, due to this government policy, has got a serious set-back and loss of credibility, from which it is a painful process to recover.

- In the eighties and first part of the nineties supply of gas to Europe was expected to be abundant;
- Security of Supply was (therefore) not considered to be an issue;
- Regulation of the gas sector was very much done along the lines of the regulation of the electricity sector.

- The European (and World) gas market changed towards a sellers market during the implementation of regulation/liberalization;
- And it became clear that Europe will become more and more dependent from a small number of countries:
- Security of Supply is (again) on the agenda!

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### **Regulation Electricity**



#### **Business levels**


#### production

- transmission
- distribution/consumption

#### **Electricity chain:**

- Production close to consumption
  - (local, regional, national scale)
- Regulation on a national level
  - (foreseeable effects; consistency)

# **Regulation Gas**



- At the same time LNG is connecting regional markets (North America, Europe, Japan / Pacific Rim and
- "New" gas import regions are making their presence at the world gas market known (India, China and Renewed US)
- This combination implies competition for supplies between gas importing regions:

- Competition will NOT ONLY be on PRICE;
- But also on the conditions at and structure of the competing markets and the investment climate;
- So the type of regulation in an importing region/country will have an effect on its attractiveness for an exporting country;
- To reduce (regulatory) risks exporting countries also want to diversify!

- Investments in gas infrastructure should also be encouraged:
- Competition flourishes better with a slight overcapacity.
- But there must be a sound fin./econ. base for investments:"Open Season", to assess the market demand for new capacity

- Regulators in Europe and the EU-Commission understand that some regulatory changes are necessary:
- In the UK since some time Long Term Contracts to enter the National Grid (up to >10 years) are made possible again;
- Exemptions are granted to certain infrastructure projects, but uncertainty for investors remains. (e.g.LNGterminals)

- Managing expectations is key for an acceptable result: liberalization is not in itself leading to lower prices, if done well it leads to higher efficiency, but
- Prices of gas in a free market will be determined by the structural supply / demand balance.
- Strong price volatility is also part and parcel of a liberalized gas market

#### **Do we need Regulation for Mobile Gas Storages too??**



